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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1011 
        _____________ 
 
CHRISTY JACKSON, 
 
               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, INC. 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. No. 2-09-cv-00386) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on July 12, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 18, 2012) 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Christy Jackson appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to her 
employer, Temple University Hospital, Inc. (Temple Hospital), on her claims against it 
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alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 
2000e-17.  Jackson claims that Temple Hospital terminated her employment because she 
is African American and in retaliation for her complaining of racially discriminatory 
treatment in the workplace.  We find that there is no genuine issue of material fact in 
relation to either of these claims and that the hospital is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on them.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 From 1988 to 2007, Jackson worked as a secretary in the Department of 
Respiratory Care at Temple Hospital.  In the second half of 2006, the hospital’s corporate 
parent, Temple University Health System, Inc. (Temple Health System) incurred 
significant monetary losses and, in response, sought to reduce operating costs.  To this 
end, it decided to conduct a system-wide reduction in force.  In implementing this 
measure at Temple Hospital, it was determined that the positions that had the least impact 
on patient care and that involved duties that could be assumed by other employees would 
be the ones that would be eliminated. 
 Responsibility for initially identifying such positions within the Respiratory Care 
Department fell to John Mullarkey, who was Director of Respiratory Care and also 
Jackson’s direct supervisor.  This department had 50 employees, and Mullarkey selected 
for potential elimination the only two positions which did not require state certification in 
respiratory care – Jackson’s secretarial position and an equipment technician position.  
Mullarkey discussed these possible reductions with his direct supervisor, Cecilia 
Pemberton, Administrative Director of the Lung Center.  She ultimately recommended to 
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her own supervisor, Sandra Gomberg, Associate Hospital Director, that Jackson’s 
position, but not the equipment technician position, be eliminated. 
 Gomberg approved this recommendation in January 2007, and on January 29, 
2007, Jackson’s position was included on the Temple University Health System 
Remediation Plan, a document listing all positions that would be eliminated.  Jackson’s 
name continued to appear on all subsequent revised versions of this document until the 
reduction in force was officially implemented.  That occurred on February 16, 2007, 
when 450 positions were eliminated system-wide.  The reduction encompassed 34 
positions at Temple Hospital, among which was Jackson’s. 
 On January 28, 2009, Jackson filed this lawsuit against Temple Hospital in which 
she alleged that her employment was terminated because she is African American, in 
violation of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  She also claimed that her 
employment was terminated in retaliation for her sending a letter to Temple University’s 
Office of Affirmative Action on February 2, 2007, complaining about allegedly racially 
discriminatory treatment, in violation of the same two statutes.
1
  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  The District Court granted summary judgment on both of these 
claims to Temple Hospital on December 1, 2010, and Jackson now appeals.
 
 
                                              
1
 Jackson also initially raised a claim under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.  She abandoned that claim in the District Court, and it is not 
relevant to this appeal. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over Jackson’s claims based on 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We do the same with respect to her appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  
Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2004).  We must accordingly 
determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact in relation to Jackson’s 
claims and whether Temple Hospital is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).   
 Because both claims are based on circumstantial rather than direct evidence, this 
analysis must be conducted according to the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 192 
F.3d 378, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1999).  Under that framework, a plaintiff bears an initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie case of a Title VII violation.  McDonnell Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802.  If this is accomplished, the burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate 
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the alleged violation.  Id.  “[S]hould the 
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were 
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 
198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).  These last two steps of the analysis 
need not be addressed here, however, because Jackson fails to make out a prima facie 
case of either claim. 
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 A. Discrimination 
 To establish a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination under Title 
VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified 
for the position she sought to retain or attain, (3) she was subjected to an adverse 
employment action, and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an 
inference that the adverse action was taken on account of her membership in the 
protected class.  See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).  To satisfy the 
fourth element of the prima facie case where, as here, the basis of a plaintiff’s claim is an 
employment termination conducted in the context of a reduction in force, she must 
present evidence that similarly situated persons outside of her protected class were 
retained.  See In Re:  Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 294-95 (3d Cir. 1997); 
Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Consol. Rail 
Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2002).  Jackson, however, failed to do so. 
 She argues that a document in the record known as a “remediation summary” 
establishes that ten similarly situated employees who were not African American were 
retained. That document, however, does not include any information on those employees’ 
race or ethnicity, and thus fails to substantiate her claim.  She also cites a document 
summarizing the impact of the reduction in force on non-bargaining employees of six 
different racial groups.  As an initial matter, Jackson is not a non-bargaining employee, 
meaning that this document relates to a population of which she is not a member and 
consequently cannot be deemed to pertain to similarly situated employees. Moreover, 
though it can be deduced from this document that non-bargaining Temple Hospital 
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employees who were not African American were retained, the document only categorizes 
employees into seven broad groups and is therefore insufficiently detailed to establish 
that any of those employees was similarly situated to Jackson.  There is thus no evidence 
in the record showing that employees who were similarly situated to Jackson and who 
were not African American were retained in the reduction in force.  She accordingly has 
not made out a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination, and Temple 
Hospital is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 
 B.  Retaliation 
 To establish a prima facie claim of unlawful retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff 
must show that (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) her employer took 
an adverse action against her, and (3) there was a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse action.  See Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-
41 (3d Cir. 2006).  Jackson claims that her employment was terminated in retaliation for 
her sending a letter to Temple University’s Office of Affirmative Action complaining of 
racially discriminatory treatment.  It is undisputed that this letter was sent on February 2, 
2007.  Evidence in the record, though, such as the Temple University Health System 
Remediation Plan and declarations of Mary Beth Oberg and Sandra Gomberg, shows that 
the decision to terminate Jackson’s position was already made in January 2007.  Jackson 
fails to contradict this evidence.  There is accordingly no genuine dispute that the 
decision to eliminate her position was made before she mailed her letter to the Office of 
Affirmative Action.  Based on this sequence, she cannot establish a causal connection 
between the termination of her employment and her sending that letter.  As a result, she 
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fails to make a prima facie case that the termination constituted unlawful retaliation, and 
Temple Hospital was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons explained above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 2 
                                              
2
 Jackson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are governed by standards identical to those 
applicable to her Title VII claims.  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 
(3d Cir. 1999).  Therefore, based on our preceding analysis, Temple Hospital is also 
entitled to summary judgment on Jackson’s § 1981 claims. 
